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Abstract—Context: Cryptographic APIs are said to be not
usable and researchers suggest to add example code to the
documentation. Aim: We wanted to create a free platform for
cryptographic code examples that improves the usability and
security of created applications by non security experts. Method:
We created the open-source web platform CryptoExamples and
conducted a controlled experiment where 58 students added
symmetric encryption to a Java program. We then measured
the usability and security. Results: The participants who used
the platform were not only significantly more effective (+73 %)
but also their code contained significantly less possible security
vulnerabilities (-66 %). Conclusions: With CryptoExamples the
gap between hard to change API documentation and the need
for complete and secure code examples can be closed. Still, the
platform needs more code examples.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many cryptographic software libraries cannot be used easily
and there are many approaches to improve (cryptographic) APIs
[1]. A popular approach is not to improve the API itself but
to develop tools that assist the developer using the APIs. The
problem with tools is that, the programmer has to know about
them, install them and use them. These 3 obstacles prevent
many tools from being used. Another approach is to improve
the APIs themselves. This is much harder, because often the
API authors have to be involved. And even then it is difficult
to change the API itself, because of backwards compatibility
[2]. Improving the documentation is therefore a more feasible
approach that also reaches the developers. One subset of the
documentation are code examples. Many code examples can
be found on the Q & A platform StackOverflow. Acar et al.
[3] found out, that only 17% of the code examples are secure.
Their conclusion is that “API documentation is secure but hard
to use, while informal documentation such as Stack Overflow
is more accessible but often leads to insecurity”. As it can be
difficult and a long process to get changes accepted for standard
libraries [2], we describe our approach with CryptoExamples
(www.cryptoexamples.com) and present empirical results.
II. CRYPTOEXAMPLES
The goal of CryptoExamples is to offer secure, complete,
minimal, copyable, free and tested code examples for common
crypto scenarios in various programming languages. In the
following we describe how these requirements and a few others
are achieved:
1) The common cryptographic scenarios were derived from
a study by Nadi et al. [4] on GitHub projects that apply
cryptography. Most projects need or have problems with
symmetric/asymmetric encryption, signatures and verification,
and generation and storage of secret keys. 2) The platform is
open-source with an easy contribution and sanitation process. It
is easy to contribute new examples or update the existing ones,
because examples are available in separate public repositories
for each library. This means, that the crowd can not only
report security problems, but also can provide solutions for
them and they can easily be integrated. This reduces the
time vulnerable code is available. 3) CryptoExamples tries
to use only standard library functionality to ensure copiability.
Examples should not introduce additional dependencies or
require other configurations that could reduce their ease of
integration. Therefore only APIs that are available in the
programming language’s standard library should be expected
to be present for the example code. 4) We apply both static
analysis tools and rely on expert code reviews to ensure secure
cryptographic functionality. This is needed to keep up with
new hardware generations that can apply brute force techniques
faster and as new vulnerabilities are found, the parameters have
to be kept up-to-date. 5) Copyable code is also made possible
by using the free license “The Unlicense” that does not require
developers to attribute or otherwise license the work. 6) The
examples support the latest stable releases of the programming
language and related tools and libraries. The examples
should not cover all, especially not old, outdated and possibly
insecure versions of programming languages. This backwards
compatibility is currently not included in the platform but
might be considered in the future. 7) Indicate reviewed code.
The contributions to the example code repositories have to be
reviewed by an expert for that domain and then proposed to the
project maintainers for integration and wider publication via
the website. Currently we follow a best effort principle. 8) We
apply and require automatic unit tests for all code examples.
III. EVALUATION
We performed a controlled experiment similar to the one
by Mindermann, Keck, and Wagner [5] to find out how
CryptoExamples changes the usability in practice. The task was
to modify the application to not send plaintext but encrypt the
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text before with the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Half
of the participants had to use standard library of Java with its
Cryptography Extension (JCE) and the others a library which
states that it focuses on usability, Keyczar. Then half of each
group was given an opened web browser with the summary
page for the corresponding library on CryptoExamples. This
enabled them to look for a suitable example code that they
could apply to the task in the experiment. Other participants
could also use the web to search for example code, as all of
them did. We made sure to check the screen recordings that
none of these participants used CryptoExamples.
The 58 participants were all students with mostly software
engineering as course of study (85%), with an average age of 21,
and mostly male (2 unspecified, and 4 females). They rated their
programming experience on average with 5.4 ∈ [0, 10] and their
crypto and security knowledge on average with 3.9 ∈ [0, 10]
(where 5 stood for average knowledge/experience).
We observed that the effectiveness (either the task was
completed or not) for the task was increased on average by
73% with code example, also the Chi-squared test with no
continuity correction suggests (p = 0.035 < 0.05) that we can
reject the null hypothesis that there is an equal probability for
success with or without example. If we look at both libraries
individually we see that the biggest increase was for the Java
Development Kit (JDK) (effectiveness increased by 184%).
Similar to the effectiveness, we observed an efficiency
increase from 0.58 to 1.3 tasks per hour for participants that got
an example. Wilcoxon’s test suggests with p = 0.008 < 0.05
that we can reject the null hypothesis that the examples do not
increase the efficiency. Interestingly, the efficiency also almost
doubled for Keyczar. The examples make it significantly faster
to implement crypto related tasks, at least for the scenario set
in the experiment.
The examples also increased the satisfaction from 52.5 to
63.7 with example, measured with the System Usability Scale
(SUS, Brooke [6]). This is also significant finding according to
a t-test with p = 0.01 < 0.05 that suggests to reject the null
hypothesis that the SUS is greater without example.
We analyzed the security of the produced code by counting
warnings in the category Security (reported by Find Security
Bugs/SpotBugs. We observed a drop by 66% for participants
that used our examples. Here the Chi-squared test lets us
reject the null hypothesis (p = 0.037 < 0.05) that there is no
dependency between the number of security warnings and if
the participants got an example.
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We wanted to close the research gap for cryptographic
code examples [3] with the platform CryptoExamples that
offers minimal, complete, tested and secure code examples.
We think CryptoExamples is a big step in the right direction,
because its goals and current state make it a good candidate
to promote contributions to the documentation of APIs with
appropriate and usable code examples. Also StackOverflow
authors could link to these examples for reference, create new
ones if the use case is common enough and even improve and
sanitize existing examples with their knowledge on a central
platform. The evaluation shows that the provided examples
can improve several usability factors and increase the security
significantly. Nevertheless, the examples still need to be fitting
for a specific task, but we try to cover common scenarios
[4]. Our project might become outdated too, but its simple
contribution and sanitation concept based on git and GitHub
make it a better alternative to the existing resources. An
integration into the API documentation of the corresponding
libraries would be ideal. For example Rust supports compiling
code in the documentation, which makes it easier to maintain
code examples together with the API. Now CryptoExamples
has to be extended to provide examples for other programming
languages, have better visualization of meta-data and experts
have to be motivated to review the code examples. Additionally,
we plan to extend the analysis of the evaluation results, e.g.
analyze the answers to the Generic Cognitive Dimension
Questionnaire for Evaluating Security APIs [7].
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